In November 2001, 5,558 readers of the German weekly Die Zeit participated in a three person ultimatum experiment involving a proposer X, a responder Y, and a dummy Z (Güth and van Damme, 1998) . A proposal is a vector (x, y, z) with x + y + z = DM 1200, and x ∈ {0,200,400,600,800,1000}, and y, z ∈ {100,200,300,400,500,600}. Newspaper readers could participate via internet, mail, or fax and had to decide in the role of X on the proposal and to indicate acceptance or rejection of any of the 18 different proposals in the role of Y. Response behavior is not always monotonic in the responder's share, suggesting that a substantial share of participants is intrinsically interested in a fair allocation. Participants using the internet are more opportunistic than those using mail or fax whereas older participants and women care more about fairness. Students behave similar to non-students of the same age group suggesting at least age group-specific external validity of experimental results relying on student participants. 
Introduction
A newspaper experiment on a three person-ultimatum game (Güth and van Damme, 1998) is presented, which attracted 5,558 readers of the German weekly Die Zeit in November 2001.
In this experiment, X proposes how to distribute a pie of DM 1.200 (about € 600) among himself, a responder (Y), and a dummy player (Z) . If the responder accepts this proposal then all three players receive their corresponding share, otherwise, in case of rejection, all receive zero.
In recent years, newspaper experiments have become more popular, because they offer the chance to address a large audience from the general public avoiding the selection bias of typical student experiments.
1 Hence, newspaper experiments provide an opportunity to explore external validity, i.e., to test 'parallelism' between the lab and the field. So far, this methodological concern has been one of the main motivations for newspaper experiments, in particular in a series of newspaper experiments on the guessing game, where BoschDomenech et al. (2000) have found very similar patterns when comparing lab and newspaper data.
However, besides parallelism between the lab and the field, two important opportunities of newspaper experiments have been missed so far. First, by attracting a much broader and more heterogeneous audience than is possible in the lab, newspaper experiments allow to study the influence of a subject's age on decision making. Typically, participants in lab experiments are students of age 20 to 25 whereas participants in newspaper experiments include almost always the full range from teenagers to retired persons. Hence, experimental results based on student populations might fail to reflect the behavior of older generations like their concern for fairness. Some papers have addressed the question whether children make different decisions than adults do. Murningham and Saxon (1998) report ultimatum bargaining of 3 rd graders and 6 th graders in kindergarten, finding that 3 rd graders offer less (33%) than 6 th graders (48%) in the role of proposer and that 6 th graders offer about the same as adults. Harbaugh and Krause (2000) find children's altruism in public good or dictator experiments to resemble the altruism of adults. In a subsequent paper, Harbaugh et al. (2001) find only small differences in rational 1 Other differences between laboratory and newspaper experiments concern the duration of an experiment and monetary rewards. Lab experiments seldom last longer than one or two hours. Participants in a newspaper experiment often have one or two weeks time to send in their decisions, thus giving them more time to reason. Average rewards for student participants are typically close to the hourly wage for students, whereas rewards for newspaper experiments can be much higher in absolute terms but lower in expected rewards due to their much choice behavior between kids and adults. However, the benchmark 'adults' are typically students in their early 20ies, implicitly assuming that they are representative of all adults. Yet, we are not aware of studies in experimental economics addressing the question whether students differ in their behavior from older (and non-student) adults. 2 This is somehow surprising given the fact that the older generations dispose of the vast majority of assets in society. 3 Since the results of relatively simple bargaining experiments with student participants started a lively debate and inspired various ideas how to explain human behavior observed in these experiments 4 , it seems appropriate to extend the experimental studies on student bargaining behavior to a much larger audience where we can control for possible age effects.
Second, newspaper experiments (like ours) are typically run by allowing submissions via regular mail, fax, or internet and can thus illuminate the effects of different media on economic decision making. The rapidly increasing share of electronic business transactions (see Lucking-Reiley and Spulber, 2001; Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Roth and Ockenfels, 2001) makes it in our view important to consider the possible effects of different transaction media on economic decisions and bargaining. Shavit et al. (2001) have examined whether students evaluate lotteries differently when making their decisions with paper and pen in the classroom or computerized via the internet. Their results indicate that subjects' risk aversion might be lower in the internet. Our newspaper experiment offers an opportunity to examine how bargaining behavior is affected by the medium.
In our earlier newspaper experiment of a two-person ultimatum game (Güth et al., 2002) with 1,035 readers of a daily newspaper, the Berliner Zeitung, we found that the medium by which participants submit their decisions is an important signal: internetters appear as more greedy and opportunistic than participants relying on letter or fax. We had, however, no data on age or education level of our participants. Therefore, the effects of different media might larger number of (expected) participants. For a discussion of methodological differences between laboratory and newspaper experiments see Bosch-Domènech et al. (2000) . 2 In a recent paper Hannan et al. (2002) test for differences in a gift exchange game between undergraduates and (older) MBA students who have several years of work experience. The results show MBAs to provide substantially higher effort levels than undergraduates. The authors conjecture that this difference may result from the MBAs prior work experience in white-collar jobs where gift exchange plays an important role. 3 In the context of intergenerational transfers and savings it has been estimated that in the U.S. about 80% of total assets are transferred from parents to adult children with about 50% inter vivos transfers (see, e.g. Kotlikoff, 1988; Gale and Scholz, 1994) . 4 See Bolton (1991) , Rabin (1993) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Charness and Rabin (2002), or Roth (1995) for a survey. All models incorporating fairness, other-regarding, or social preferences require common knowledge of other subjects' preferences. The assumption of common knowledge of other simply reflect an average age or education discrepancy. Our new experiment is designed to disentangle such confounding effects.
One of the most surprising results of Güth et al. (2002) is that acceptance of all possible offers (in nine discrete steps from DM 100 to DM 900) is the modal response behavior and that 34.9% of participants are willing to accept the lowest possible offer of DM 100 which amounts to 10% of the disposable pie of DM 1,000. Acceptance rates of the smallest possible offer are typically by far smaller in lab experiments (see Slonim and Roth, 1998) .
Interestingly, about 10% of participants rely on non-monotonic response strategies meaning to accept all offers above a certain minimum, larger than the smallest possible offer, and to reject all offers above a certain maximum, at or below the largest possible offer. Non-monotonic strategies can be detected when using the strategy (vector) method, and they seem to play more than a marginal role in bargaining.
Besides re-examining the frequency of non-monotonic strategies in ultimatum bargaining, the three person-ultimatum game (Güth and van Damme, 1998) The first laboratory experiment (Güth and van Damme, 1998) employed undergraduate students from the University of Tilburg, who could share 120 points (about $6.80 at that subjects' preferences is hard to defend in a newspaper experiment where the number and characteristics of participants is neither predictable nor under complete control. 5 Introducing a third person as in Güth and van Damme (1998) makes it easier to disentangle the strategic implications of the ultimatum game and the dictator game, respectively. There are other types of three personultimatum games as well (see Knez and Camerer, 1995 , Güth et al., 1996 , Kagel and Wolfe, 2001 , Riedl and Výrašteková, 2002 which differ from the one by Güth and van Damme (1998) in that they have two (competing) responders instead of one responder and one dummy player. time). In the full information treatment 6 , responders care only very little for the dummy and base their decision on whether to accept or reject a proposal mainly on their own share y.
Anticipating this, proposers offer on average slightly more than one third of the pie to the responder, and keep most of the rest for themselves. The overall conclusion is that proposers do not have a strong intrinsic motivation for fairness. Since proposers take into account response behavior, they abstain from proposing the game theoretic solution and instead offer the responder what seems to be a fair share, namely about one third of the pie.
In order to be manageable as a newspaper experiment, our design of the three personultimatum game differs in two important aspects from the one of Güth and van Damme (1998):
1. Rather than having the game played sequentially, the strategy vector method (every participant has to decide both in the role of X and Y) is employed and expectations about the modal strategy vector are elicited.
2. A coarser grid and further restrictions for the possible proposals (x,y,z) limit the number of choices required by the strategy vector method.
Compared to our former newspaper experiment on two person-ultimatum bargaining (Güth et al., 2002) , the main differences are the more complex game structure due to the additional player (Z), a control group of student subjects, and data on gender as well as (voluntarily) on age and profession.
In the following section 2 the experimental design is described in more detail and general media data on readers of Die Zeit is presented. Section 3 reports data on participation and section 4 presents the main results. In section 5 we discuss the issue of parallelism between student and non-student participants. Section 6 concludes.
Experimental Design
Die Zeit is probably Germany's most prestigious weekly magazine. According to the independent media analyst Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media-Analyse (see www.zeit.de) there are 6 Güth and van Damme vary the information conditions such that the responder gets to know (i) the proposed shares for all persons, (ii) only the share for himself, or (iii) only the share for the dummy. In information condition (iii), the modal proposal allocates (almost) all of the cake to X. In both other cases, the responder receives slightly more than one third of the pie. According to these requirements there are 18 possible proposals (x, y, z) of which a subject in the role of X has to select one (see Appendix B for the decision form). In the role of Y, a subject has to determine for all 18 possible proposals (x, y, z) whether to accept or reject it (strategy method for Y). Acceptance means that a subject in the role of X earns the amount x, and Y and Z the amounts y and z, respectively. In case of a rejection all three parties earn nothing.
The instructions inform participants that 18 of them will be randomly selected for actual payments according to the rules by partitioning them into 6 teams of three players each and by assigning randomly the roles X, Y, and Z in each team. 8 In addition, participants had to fill out the prediction form (see Appendix B) asking for their expectations for the most frequently selected proposal and the most frequent behavior (accept or reject) for all 18 proposals. Of those, who successfully predicted the most frequent strategy vector, 7 randomly selected participants 9 could win a prediction prize of DM 400.
The obvious advantage of the strategy method 10 is to deliver more complete decision data, yet the disadvantage is that the timing of decisions is not reflected. This may have some important psychological effects which we would like to address briefly. When having to react to all possible contingencies in a game instead of reacting only to prior moves a subject may be induced to think more carefully, e. g. by considering also the concerns of other players. For instance, when deciding on which proposal to choose in the role of X, a subject might consider how player Y will feel and react when facing a meager offer y or an ill-treatment of Z. Emotion theory (Frijda, 1986 , Loewenstein, 2000 , Bosman and van Winden, 2002 refers to a 'cold' state of decision making when emotions have to be anticipated and thus play only a minor role. When being in a 'hot' state, i.e. when knowing in the role of Y which proposal has actually been selected by X, emotions are actually experienced and should therefore play a more important role, e. g. by overriding opportunistic (payoff-maximizing) deliberations.
Irrespective of these pros and cons the strategy method is for all practical reasons the only straightforward way to run a newspaper experiment.
General data on participation
Participation was possible either by cutting out the newspaper slip, filling it out, and mailing or faxing it, or by using a computerized fill-out form that was available on the Internet site of Die Zeit 11 . Table 1 reports the frequency of participation by media type and subjects pool. In total, 5,558 subjects participated in our experiment of which 1,681 (30.2%) used mail and 490 (8.8%) fax, whereas 2,961 (53.3%) participated via the Internet. The remaining 426 (7.7%) submissions were filled out in classroom situations either in high schools or at a university. The classroom experiments were an initiative of the respective instructors without former contacts to the authors, and data of all participants were submitted collectively by the instructors. 12 One classroom session was performed with business students during a microeconomics lecture at the University of Frankfurt/Main with altogether 255 participants 13 , the other classroom data rely on 10 school classes from various parts of Germany.
Table 1 about here
We were aware that filling out a paper and pen-form can lead to incomplete answers in spite of all the hints that we require completely filled out decision and prediction forms. A submission was classified as valid if a subject had given a full address and had indicated the 10 See Roth (1995, p. 322f.) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the strategy method. 11 See http://www.zeit.de/specials/wirtschaftsspiel/wirtschaftsspiel.html (access: February 25, 2002) . 12 In the following, we will refer to submissions by fax, mail, or internet as 'personal submissions' and to data from classroom experiments as 'collective submissions'. 13 We thank Georg Hirte for conducting the experiment.
chosen proposal (as well as the most frequently expected proposal) in the role of X, whether to accept or reject any of the 18 different proposals in the role of Y and the corresponding expectations. On a voluntary basis, participants were asked to state their age and their profession.
Compared to Güth et al. (2002) , who report a share of incomplete mail submissions of 21.8%, our relatively low share (3.4%) of invalid mail submissions might be attributed to the improved instructions for the newspaper slip. The many invalid faxes (40.8%) were due to the partly colored decision form. 14 Some participants of the classroom experiments did not give their name and address and were therefore disregarded. On the Internet incomplete submissions could be avoided by not allowing confirmation (and transmission of the data) until all necessary fields had been filled out. The 7 (0.2%) invalid submissions were due to nonsensical addresses.
In addition to the huge number of submissions we received about 100 comments, some of them 5 pages long, from participants debating our design and its advantages and disadvantages, conjecturing about or simply asking for our research interests and intentions.
Some participants contacted us offering help for continuing our research, e.g. for crosscountry comparisons. The frequency and diligence of the comments shows that many participants actually invested quite some time thinking about the experiment. Table 2 provides some information about the characteristics of our participants, namely their age distribution and gender and how this interacts with the medium by which they participated. In total, 4066 participants with valid submissions (79%) indicated their age. The youngest participant was 8 years old, and the oldest one 96. The overall average age is 39.5 years, with 56% of participants being younger than the overall average. 15 Internet participants with an average age of 36.6 years are significantly younger than participants using either mail or fax with averages of 46.6 and 48.2, respectively (p < 0.001, t-test). Not surprisingly, participants in the classroom experiments (students and pupils) are on average the youngest participants.
14 The idea of the layout staff of Die Zeit was that this helps when filling out the form. We did not anticipate that the colored rows, when being faxed, turned out to be illegible in so many cases. 15 The experiment has attracted relatively younger readers of Die Zeit. Excluding students and pupils (which have been induced by their instructors to participate in the experiment), the share of participants below age 40 is slightly below 54%, which is still considerably larger than the share of general Die Zeit-readers in the same age group (37%).
Table 2 about here
The gender of the participants was identified by the first name in 4982 cases, altogether 95.6% of the valid submissions. Overall, slightly more than two thirds of participants are male. This is about 8% above the share of male Die Zeit-readers. With regards to the media, the share of male participants is larger in the internet than in mail and fax combined (χ² = 25.5; p < 0.001). Only in the pupil category females are more frequent than males, yet for this group participation is not based on self-selection but on an initiative of the respective instructor.
With respect to profession, 3364 of the personal submissions provided their profession and/or their education. Therefore, we divided the active working population into Academics (jobs that regularly require academic education, 1548 submissions) and Nonacademics (735). 16 In addition, 626 submissions indicated to be students, 195 pupils, and 258 retired.
Results
Our large data set is, first, analyzed on the aggregate level, including all 5,211 valid submissions where we distinguish between proposals and response behavior. Second, we examine the determinants of behavior by controlling for participants' characteristics with respect to chosen medium, age, and gender. Third, we address the issue of parallelism by comparing student behavior with that of non-student participants. Table 3 summarizes the actual and expected decisions in the role of proposer and responder, respectively. In the role of the proposer, 2,857 out of 5,211 participants (54.9%) choose the equal split (400,400,400). The second most frequent proposal by 16.8% of participants is (600,500,100). We refer to this proposal as the power coalition since the players with strategic power (X and Y) share (more or less equally) the pie by exploiting the 16 Unemployment was only mentioned in 2 cases.
Aggregate data analysis

Proposer behavior
dummy. The game theoretic benchmark (1000,100,100) is the third most frequent choice with 9.1% of participants. In total, the three most frequent proposals account for 80.8% of all proposals.
Table 3 about here
With regards to expectations, 61.3% of the participants expect their own proposal to be the most frequent one. The majority of participants expect the equal split (62.5%) to be most frequent, whereas the power coalition is expected as most frequent by 14% of the participants.
Only 5.7% expect the game theoretic benchmark as the most frequent choice, which is less than two thirds of its actual proportion. In fact, about one third of the subjects proposing the game theoretic benchmark expect that most participants choose the equal split.
Averaging over all decisions for the role of X, Table 4 reports the average shares allocated to X, Y and Z, both for actual decisions as well as for those expected to be most frequent. The average proposer keeps 43% of the pie (DM 516) for himself, allocates almost exactly one third to the responder and only about 24% to the dummy. The expected allocation is closer to the equal split, with the dummy basically gaining what the proposer loses. 
Responder behavior
As responders 96.7% of the subjects are willing to accept the equal split. All other proposals are accepted less often. The second most frequent proposal, the power coalition (600,500,100), is accepted by about two-thirds of all participants only. The three offers assigning to Y only DM 100, including the game theoretic benchmark, have the lowest acceptance rates of 23%. Checking for consistency of a given subject in the roles of X and Y, we find that 97.6% of subjects accept as Y their own proposal.
A general pattern of behavior in the role of Y is that all proposals with y ≥ 400 are at least accepted by a simple majority of subjects, whereas proposals with y < 400 are rejected in the majority of cases. This indicates that acceptance rates are mainly related to the share y allocated to the responder. For a given share y, acceptance rates are in most cases also higher with a higher share z for the dummy. Figure 1 visualizes the relation between acceptance rates and the share y and z. In section 4.2 more detailed econometric evidence of how acceptance rates depend on the proposed shares x, y, and z will be provided. proposing the equal split in the role of X are typically also more selective when deciding which proposals to accept. Of 2857 participants proposing the equal split, 17% accept only a single proposal, and 70% accept nine or fewer proposals.
Responder behavior can also be examined for its monotonicity with respect to payoffs. In a simple two person-ultimatum game, monotonicity of responder behavior simply means to accept all offers at or above a certain minimum acceptance level min. Table 5 reports the frequency of monotonic strategies, being defined in any of the three ways introduced above. The 1,122 subjects (21.5% of participants) which accept all possible offers can be subsumed under any of the three definitions of monotonicity. In the left part of proposals satisfy this definition of monotonicity with c = 900. According to Table 6, 484 participants accept the equal split only, so that c = 0. Between both extremes (0 < c < 900), there are only 33 subjects making their decision as responders strictly contingent on the maximum difference between any two shares x, y, or z. Table 6 about here
Determinants of behavior
In the following, the determinants of behavior are explored in more detail by studying how behavior depends on age and gender of a participant as well as the medium chosen for submission. We distinguish between internet submissions and submissions by mail or fax.
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Of our four categories for age the first one consists of all participants under 26, therefore including pupils and most students (who participated on their own initiative). The second age group (26 to 45 years) captures the first half of professional life and the third (46 to 65 years) its second half. The fourth age group (over 65 years) essentially represents retirement.
First of all, a general aspect of proposer behavior is explored. In view of the obvious power hierarchy -in the sense that X is stronger than Y, and Y is stronger than Z -one might expect proposals which satisfy x > y > z. Table 7 presents the frequency of obeying the power hierarchy for certain subclasses as well as for the whole data. Overall, 26.3% of all proposals obey the strict power hierarchy. It turns out that the frequency of participants expecting the most frequent proposal to obey the power hierarchy is significantly smaller (with 22.7% of participants). Comparing actual and expected proposals supports the evidence from Table 3 that, on average, participants expect most others to be slightly more equity oriented in the role of X than they are themselves.
Table 7 about here
The separate data for media, classroom, gender, and age groups in Table 7 basically confirm for each subgroup that the frequency of actual proposals obeying the power hierarchy is larger than the frequency of expected proposals with x > y > z. Note that the frequency of actual proposals with x > y > z is significantly larger in the internet than in mail/fax (p < 0.01, χ²-test), larger in the student classroom group than with high-school pupils (p < 0.1), larger in the male than in the female population (p < 0.01), and larger the younger the subject pool (p < 0.01, ANOVA). Such results are based on a rather coarse classification of data which does not yet explore the interaction of medium, age, or gender. Table 8 reports average data for decisions in the role of X and Y, respectively, for a given age group separated by medium and gender. 20 For the sake of clarity, only the three most frequent proposals are examined: the equal split (400,400,400), the power coalition (600,500,100) and the game theoretic benchmark (1000,100,100). In the left part of the Table 8 states the number of observations in a subgroup. For instance, the age group (26 -45) has 873 male participants using the internet, and 354 male participants using mail/fax.
Table 8 about here
The frequency of proposing the equal split increases usually with age for any subgroup 21 , whereas the frequency of choosing the power coalition or the game theoretic benchmark is, on average, declining with age, even though the relationship is less regular than for the equal split. Female participants for a given medium always choose the equal split more often than 20 In this table, we restrict ourselves to the data from personal submissions, i.e. we exclude data from classroom experiments. Section 5 deals with differences of collective submissions and personal submissions. 21 There is a single exception. The relative frequency of the equal split is higher for females using the internet in the age group 26 to 45 than for 46 to 65. male participants. A star ( * ) indicates that the distribution of X-proposals is significantly different between both sexes, given a certain medium and age group. Altogether, women care more for equity than men. Male participants, on the contrary, are more likely to propose the power coalition or the game theoretic benchmark.
Regarding media of submission, the equal split is almost in any case more likely in mail/fax-than in internet submissions 22 , whereas the reverse holds for the game theoretic benchmark. Although the distribution of proposals for a given age group and gender does not significantly differ between internet and mail/fax (except for men of age 26 to 45), the results confirm the conclusion of 'fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet' (Güth et al., 2002) , which can be further refined to 'fairness in the mail submissions of older females and opportunism in the internet submissions of younger males'.
Opportunism in the internet can also be detected in the acceptance rates of responders.
Irrespective of gender, acceptance rates for the power coalition and theoretic benchmark are always higher in the internet than in mail/fax, with many of the differences significant (indicated by # ). Acceptance rates of the equal split are always highest and show only few significant differences between media and sexes. When comparing acceptance rates between sexes for a given age group and medium, a slightly more complicated picture emerges: in the age groups 26 to 45 and 46 to 65, respectively, men always (and in most cases significantly, see + ) accept more often the power coalition and the theoretic benchmark. In the age groups under 26 and over 65, this is mostly reversed, but with only one of the gender effects being significant.
To further explore the determinants of accepting or rejecting a given proposal we run a probit regression, including demographic data on age (in years), gender (1 for male) and medium (1 for internet) and four additional structural variables measuring deviations from the equal split (see Table 9 ). By distinguishing deviations from the equal split in the direction of a lower share and in the direction of a higher share for a given player we can account for the possibility of non-monotonic strategies (see the discussion of Tables 5 and 6 above).
Significantly negative signs of all four structural variables can reveal whether acceptance rates are non-monotonic in y and z, with a peak at the equal split. If acceptance rates, however, depended monotonically on the responder's share y, then the sign of max{0, 400 -y} should be negative and that of max{0, y -400} positive.
Table 9 about here
The dependent variable takes on the value 1 when a proposal is accepted and zero if not.
Since individual acceptance decisions for all 18 proposals are likely to be correlated, an error components econometric model with the individual as the random component is used. 23 Table   9 reports the results for personal submissions. Confirming our discussion of Table 8 , we find that the probability to accept a given proposal declines with age, and is lower for women than for men, and for submissions via mail/fax than for those via the internet.
Furthermore, acceptance rates are monotonic in the share y, as indicated by the negative coefficient for max{0, 400 -y} and the positive one for max{0, y -400}. Yet, the smaller absolute size of the positive coefficient than that of the negative one reveals a kink at the equal split. The probability to accept is non-monotonic for the dummy's share z, as can be judged from the negative signs of both, max{0, 400 -z} and max{0, z -400}. Hence, for a given y, the probability to accept a given proposal is higher the closer z to the equal split.
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Summarizing we can say that -controlling for other variables -the chosen medium has a significant impact on behavior. Internet users appear more opportunistic in the sense of being guided more by own earnings than participants using mail/fax. Furthermore, older participants and women care more about fairness in their proposals and are also more likely to reject an unfair offer.
Parallelism
Parallelism, or the external validity of decisions made by students, can be investigated, first, by comparing the submissions from classroom experiments with personal submissions.
Second, we may distinguish professional groups, e. g. by comparing 'students' with other professions.
25 23 Failing to account for these correlations would underestimate standard errors of the coefficients. 24 We also estimated alternative specifications of the probit model. Considering either the demographic variables only or the structural variables only leads to the same signs of coefficients and similar significance levels as reported in Table 9 . We also did the probit analysis for classroom data separated by students and pupils. The estimations of the structural variables indicate that acceptance rates are monotonic with y (with a kink at the equal split for pupils) and non-monotonic in z. Gender effects are not significant in both cases. 25 Since most experiments rely on student participants this seems to be the most important distinction in experimental research.
Of course, we did not control under which conditions the experiments were run in the classroom. Partly, we contacted the lecturers in order to obtain more information. The experiment with the student group in Frankfurt, for instance, was run at the end of a lecture on game theory and was used to illustrate game theory. 26 The other 10 classroom experiments were run in rather small classes with 10 to 25 pupils. In about half of the cases, teachers used the experiment as a warm-up for discussing problems of social life like fairness in bargaining or income distribution. Table 10 reports the main data on decision making for both types of classroom situations (students at the University of Frankfurt/Main and pupils) and for personal submissions, respectively. Regarding the latter, we report both, the overall data and the data of personal submissions by participants under 26 who are closest in age to classroom participants (see Table 2 for the average age of students and pupils).
Table 10 about here
The students of the University of Frankfurt/Main reveal a strikingly different behavior from that diagnosed so far, which in our view reflects the conditions under which the experiment was run. Only 10.4% propose the equal split, less than one fifth of the frequency in personal submissions (56.8%); further 35.2% of students propose the game theoretic benchmark, about four times the fraction in personal submissions (8.3%). Even when comparing the distribution of student proposals with those by personal submissions "under 26", Frankfurt students are much more opportunistic: on average, they allocate DM 714 (59.5% of the pie) to themselves in the role of X and only DM 153 (12.8%) to the dummy player Z. In the role of the responder Y Frankfurt students have significantly higher acceptance rates for the game theoretic benchmark and the power coalition than personal submissions (χ²-test, df = 1; p < 0.01 for any comparison). For the Frankfurt students the power coalition would have been the payoff maximizing proposal yielding an expected profit of DM 553.
The behavior of pupils is more similar to that one of personal submissions. The frequency of proposing the equal split lies between the frequency in the subgroup of personal submissions "under 26" and the one for all personal submissions. There is, however, a marked difference with respect to the frequency of proposing the power coalition, which is chosen more often than in personal submissions, or the game theoretic benchmark, which is very rare (1.3%) for pupils. 27 On average, pupils demand as X-player DM 473 (39.4%) which is only 8.8% more than what they grant to the Y-player. Thus, pupils do not seem to care (more) for the dummy (than personal submissions). Acceptance rates of pupils in the role of Y are similar to those in personal submissions, with the exception of the very low acceptance rate for the game theoretic benchmark (7.3%). Summarizing, pupils' behavior seems close to that of personal submissions, the only exception being the strong rejection of the game theoretic benchmark.
Since we doubt that the behavior of the Frankfurt students is representative for students in general and since we asked participants on a voluntary basis to state their profession let us compare personal submissions who claim to be student with those stating another profession. 28 In Table 11 , aggregate data for students 29 and non-students is reported, also for non-students with age 19 to 30. The latter subset matches rather closely the age structure of the student submissions (see section c. of Table 11 ). In total, we have 632 student submissions. The distribution for the three prominent proposals in the role of X shows no significant difference between students and non-students of age 19 to 30 (χ² = 1.58; df = 2; p > 0.2) and also average amounts allocated to X, Y, and Z are almost identical for both groups.
The frequencies of accepting the three proposals also do not differ significantly according to a χ²-test. Altogether, behavior shows the same patterns and regularities for both subject pools.
30 Table 11 about here 27 The distribution of proposals differs significantly (χ²-test, df = 2; p < 0.01) both between pupils and personal submissions and between pupils and personal submissions under 26. Significance is mainly due to differences for the power coalition and the game theoretic benchmark. 28 Basically, both types of participants face the same conditions since they submitted their decisions personally (after having read Die Zeit or visited the internet address www.zeit.de). For comparing students with nonstudents, we restrict ourselves to submissions filling out a profession. 29 Note that in Tables 11 and 12 , the term 'student' refers to personal submissions stating student as profession. Students from the classroom experiment at the University of Frankfurt are excluded. 30 We do not know the percentage of non-students of age 19 to 30 being former students, and, hence, drawn from the same population as students are. But if a considerable part of non-students of age 19 to 30 were, in fact, former students, then our results would indicate that former students behave more or less in the same way as actual students.
Comparing student submissions with all personal submissions (including those of age 19 to 30) reveals a significantly different distribution for the three prominent proposals (χ² = 23.3; df = 2; p < 0.01) and significantly higher acceptance rates of students for the power coalition and the game theoretic benchmark proposal (χ²-test with df = 1 in for any pairwise comparison) which, in the light of our analysis in section 4.2, can be attributed to the large differences in the average age for student and non-student submissions (24.9 versus 43.8 years). According to the results in Tables 5 and 6 , about 52% of all 5,211 participants respond monotonically with respect to either payoffs, the sum of payoffs, or payoff differences. From Table 12 we can see that, in sum, 316 of 632 students (50%) have such a monotonic response strategy. 31 Hence, there seems to be also no essential discrepancy in the frequency of monotonic strategies between students and other participants. 
Conclusion
Our newspaper experiment has provided strong evidence for parallelism of usual experimental evidence since the behavior in personal student submissions is very similar to the behavior in non-student submissions given the same age structure. Of course, we do not claim that the behavior of students is representative of a much broader public with a more differentiated demographical structure. In particular, the age of the decision maker has a strong influence on behavior. Older participants care more for equity when proposing and by rejecting unequal distributions. One reason for this strong age effect could be that age stands for wealth. Since older participants are on average richer than younger ones (and in particular richer than students), it is relatively cheaper for them to offer more to others and to reject proposals which they regard as unfair. Another explanation could be the different experiences of older generations (during the post-war period) which might have induced stronger moral obligations, e.g. to share equally.
Like age, also gender plays an important role. There is large body of related experimental studies on gender differences in the laboratory. Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that women are significantly less selfish than men in dictator experiments, with women offering about twice as much as men. In a subsequent study (Eckel and Grossman, 2001 ) on gender effects in an ultimatum experiment they show that women are, on average, more cooperative than men.
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) of what it costs to give away money. When altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is cheap, men are more altruistic.
Our results show that women are more generous in their offers and less likely to accept unfair offers. If participants in our experiment perceived the pie at stake as a considerable reward in spite of the low probability of being selected for payment it would be rather expensive to be altruistic and our results would be similar to those of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) . Of course, our participants cover a much broader spectrum of the general population than their typical student subject pool.
Finally, the medium for submitting one's decision seems to matter. Given the growing share of e-commerce, it could be interesting to investigate the driving forces of the differences between internet and mail submissions. In our experiment, internet submissions reveal more opportunism in both roles (X and Y), what might be caused by self selection of participants or by the use of the media. In our view this should however be studied in the light of appropriate data. We therefore leave it to future research to explain the effects of media. For the time being, we would like to repeat the main finding of our experiment: Bargaining behavior is much fairer when the submission is from older female using mail/fax than when it is submitted via the internet by a young male. ES ... equal split; PC ... power coalition; TB … theoretic benchmark * … distribution of X-proposals (frequency of ES, PC, TS) differs significantly between male and female for given medium. § … distribution of X-proposals (frequency of ES, PC, TS) differs significantly between internet and mail/fax for given sex.
+ … distribution of Y-acceptance rate for given proposal differs significantly between male and female for given medium.
# … distribution of Y-acceptance rate for given proposal differs significantly between internet and mail/fax for given sex.
Notes:
For all tests, we use a χ²-test and take p < 0.05 as critical level for significance. Tests on X-proposals have df = 2; tests on Y's acceptance rate for a given proposal have df = 1.
Classroom submissions are excluded. Of the personal submissions, we include only those with known age and gender (N=3774). 
